USA v. Al Hasan by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-13-2012 
USA v. Al Hasan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Al Hasan" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1298. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1298 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-005        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3041 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
AL HAYY HASAN 
a/k/a HAYWOOD HINTON, 
Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-174) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or for 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 6, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 13, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Al Hayy Hasan pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania to one count of aiding and abetting a bank fraud.  He was 
sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.  
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We affirmed Hasan’s conviction but remanded for resentencing on a discrete issue.  See 
United States v. Hasan, 407 F. App’x 602, 603 (3d Cir. 2011).  Thereafter, the District 
Court conducted a hearing and ultimately imposed a new sentence of fifty-seven months 
of imprisonment, again followed by five years of supervised release.  The District Court’s 
amended criminal judgment was entered on June 15, 2011.1
 Five days later, the District Court denied Hasan’s pro se motion for relief under 
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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1 Hasan’s counseled appeal from that judgment was docketed at C.A. No. 11-2689. 
 
2 Rule 12(b)(3) “states that, ‘at any time while the case is pending, the court may hear a 
claim that the indictment or information fails to invoke the court’s jurisdiction or to state 
an offense.’”  United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2007).  Hasan’s motion 
was filed two months before the District Court entered its amended criminal judgment. 
  Hasan’s undated notice of 
appeal was received by the District Court thirty-five days after it entered its order on June 
20, 2011.  This might have been late under the fourteen-day time period that governs 
criminal appeals, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i), but special rules govern the 
application of that time period.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (a pro se 
prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities 
for forwarding to the district court); United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 
1989) (“in computing the timeliness of pro se prisoners’ appeals, any prison delay in 
transmitting to the prisoner notice of the district court’s final order or judgment shall be 
excluded from the computation of an appellant’s time for taking an appeal”).  In this 
particular case, we need not turn to those special rules. 
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 We recently held that “Rule 4(b) is not jurisdictional and is subject to forfeiture.”  
V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2010).  As in Martinez, here the Government 
did not respond to the Clerk’s order permitting “written argument regarding jurisdiction.”  
(Order of the Clerk dated August 10, 2011).  Nor did it invoke Rule 4(b) in a motion to 
dismiss.  Accordingly, the Government has forfeited any available untimeliness 
argument.  See Martinez, 620 F.3d at 329. 
 We therefore exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3
 In Hasan’s Rule 12(b)(3) motion, he contended that “any [plea] agreement signed 
or verbally contracted which violates Federal Statutes is NULL AND VOID.”  The 
motion also challenged the jurisdiction
  We will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s June 20, 2011 order because this appeal does not present a 
substantial question.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, --- (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
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3 The denial of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion generally occurs pre-judgment and is considered a 
non-appealable interlocutory ruling.  See United States v. Litman, 661 F.2d 17, 18 (3d 
Cir. 1981).  Because Hasan’s Rule 12 motion was denied after the District Court’s entry 
of judgment, his appeal is not “interlocutory.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary 113 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining the term “interlocutory appeal” as “[a]n appeal that occurs before the trial 
court’s final ruling on the entire case”) (emphasis added).  Were we to characterize the 
District Court’s June 20, 2011 order as something other than a ‘final,’ appealable order, 
the decision would effectively evade appellate review. 
 
 of the District Court:  “[Co-defendant] never 
signed a contract or any other piece of paper which would make a material false 
representation [in order to defraud a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
4  We use the term ‘jurisdiction’ only to be consistent with prior descriptions of Hasan’s 
arguments.  Cf. Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 320 (“We conclude that Vitillo’s challenge to the 
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§ 1344].  She had no contract with the bank; hence no involvement with the FDIC, and 
no violation of Interstate Commerce, which is the basis of all Federal Jurisdiction.”   
 The District Court noted both its rejection of identical arguments made by Hasan 
in February 2008, and that we likewise found Hasan’s arguments to be meritless on 
appeal.  See Hasan, 407 F. App’x at 603.  Accordingly, the District Court denied Hasan’s 
motion as barred by ‘the law of the case doctrine.’  The District Court alternatively found 
Hasan’s arguments to be “equally meritless the second time around.”  
 The District Court appropriately invoked the law of the case doctrine in rejecting 
Hasan’s arguments in support of Rule 12(b)(3) relief, based on the fact that those 
arguments were previously rejected by the District Court and again by this Court on 
appeal.  See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 117 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The law of the 
case doctrine ‘posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should 
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case’”) (citation 
omitted).  While there exist exceptions to the doctrine, see Schneyder v. Smith, --- F.3d --
-, 2011 WL 3211504, *13 (3d Cir. July 29, 2011, No. 10-2367), none is remotely 
applicable to Hasan’s case.  We also note that, the law of the case doctrine aside, Rule 
12(b)(3) is hardly the appropriate vehicle to challenge a guilty plea.  See United States v. 
Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, --- (3d Cir. 2011) (“Generally speaking, [Rule 12(b) triggers] a 
narrow limited analysis geared only towards ensuring that legally deficient charges do not 
                                                                                                                                                             
indictment [under Rule 12(b)(3)] is more properly characterized as a ‘pleading’ challenge 
than one of ‘jurisdiction’”).  
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go to a jury”).     
 Accordingly, for the reasons given in this opinion, we will summarily affirm the 
June 20, 2011 order of the District Court. 
